



Member of  UniCredit

# Disclosure of UniCredit Bank GmbH's Remuneration Policy

Disclosure report pursuant to (EU)  
Regulation 575/2013 as at  
31 December 2024

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# 1 INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT

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## 1.1. Introduction

UniCredit Bank GmbH is obliged to publish information on its remuneration policy, remuneration systems as well as remuneration paid to Risk Takers in accordance with Article 450 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), read in conjunction with Section 16 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (Institutsvergütungsverordnung/IVV).

The remuneration policy of UniCredit Bank GmbH is influenced by national and international regulatory requirements and laws. In addition, the interests of customers and the shareholder rank first and foremost regarding all actions and determine the orientation of the remuneration systems. Employee remuneration is geared to fair payment in conformity with market conditions and performance factors. In the process, flexibility of personnel expenses must be ensured in order to avoid risks regarding the Bank's financial situation.

Being a fully consolidated subsidiary of UniCredit S.p.A. (UniCredit), UniCredit Bank GmbH applies the remuneration principles (Group Remuneration Policy) applicable to UniCredit and all its subordinated companies (UniCredit Group). UniCredit Bank GmbH has adopted these principles subject to adjustments in the light of the applicable local regulatory and statutory requirements.

## 1.2. Disclosure obligations

The disclosure obligations on remuneration policy pursuant to Section 16 (1) of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (IVV) for UniCredit Bank GmbH as a CRR credit institution are exclusively governed by Article 450 of (EU) Regulation No. 575/2013 (CRR). **Qualitative disclosure** comprises the following points (Article 450 (1) a) - f) CRR) for categories of employees whose activities have a material impact on the risk profile (Risk Takers):

- Information on the decision-making process that leads to the definition of remuneration policy as well as on the number of meetings held by the main body responsible for remuneration supervision during the financial year, if applicable including information on the membership and mandate of a remuneration committee, on the external consultant whose services were utilized in defining remuneration policy, and on the role of the decisive stakeholders,
- Information on the correlation between remuneration and success,
- the key structural features of the remuneration system, including information on the criteria of performance assessment and risk exposure; strategy for accruals of remuneration payments; definition of entitlement criteria,
- the values defined pursuant to Article 94 para. 1 letter g of Regulation 2013/36/EU for the ratio between the fixed and variable remuneration component,
- Information on the success criteria according to which decisions are made concerning the entitlement to shares, options or variable remuneration components,
- the key parameters and justifications for systems providing for variable components and other non-cash benefits in kind.

The **quantitative disclosure** comprises the following points:

- summarized quantitative statements on remuneration for all employees, broken down into business segments,
- summarized quantitative statements on remuneration, broken down into management bodies and employees whose activities exert a material influence on the risk profile of the institution, including the following:
  - (i) the remuneration amounts for the financial year, broken down into fixed and variable remuneration, as well as the number of recipients,
  - (ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, broken down into cash, shares, share-related and other types of instruments,
  - (iii) the amounts of the outstanding remuneration deferred, broken down into vested and not yet vested entitlements,
  - (iv) the amounts of remuneration withheld that were granted, disbursed or reduced on account of performance adjustments during the financial year,
  - (v) new recruitment bonuses and severance pay disbursed during the financial year as well as the number of recipients of such payments,
  - (vi) the amounts of severance pay granted during the financial year, the number of recipients and the highest such amount awarded to an individual person,
- the number of persons whose remuneration in the financial year amounts to € 1 million or more, broken down into remuneration stages of € 500,000 in the case of remuneration payments ranging from € 1 million to € 5 million and broken down into remuneration stages of € 1 million for remuneration payments of € 5 million and more,
- if requested by the member state or the competent public authority, the total remuneration of each member of the management body.

### 1.3. Overview of regulatory developments

Owing to the financial markets crisis, the subject of remuneration has moved to center stage in the financial services industry. Based on the development of standards in 2009 by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on remuneration practices in the finance industry, the second amendment directive of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III) was adopted in the year 2010. In parallel, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors prepared what are termed CEBS Guidelines for the establishment of risk-adequate remuneration systems.

In October 2010, the law concerning the regulatory requirements of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (IVV) took account of the international regulation standards of the FSB as well as the parameters laid down in CRD III and was implemented in Germany for the first time.

During the following years the regulatory requirements for remuneration in the banking industry has been continuously refined and strengthened, on EU-level (e.g., CRD/CRR, EBA-Guidelines), as well as on national level (e.g., BaFin. IVV, KWG etc.). Currently regulations regarding remuneration systems are mainly defined in the following regulations:

- IVV ("Institutsvergütungsverordnung"/Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions) of 16 December 2013, last amended on 14 February 2023. In the IVV the relevant EU-regulations on sound remuneration policies are translated into national law in Germany.
- FAQ to the IVV from 13. June 2024 (replacing the Interpretation Guideline to the IVV from 15. February 2018)
- KWG (Kreditwesengesetz/German Banking Act), esp. Section 25a
- CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation), esp. Article 450 from 7. June 2019
- CRD V (Capital Requirements Directive) from 12 November 2020
- EBA-Guidelines published by the European Banking Authority (EBA), Final report on Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Directive 2013/36/EU (EBA/GL/2021/04) from 2 July 2021
- EBA-RTS (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/923 of 25 March 2021 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the identification of Risk Takers) published on 9 June 2021

## 2 2024 REMUNERATION POLICY AT UNICREDIT BANK GMBH

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As UniCredit Bank GmbH is an affiliate of UniCredit, its remuneration policy is based to a decisive degree on the parameters laid down within the UniCredit Group. The remuneration principles are defined Group-wide in the Group Remuneration Policy. Observance of local statutory/regulatory requirements (Remuneration Regulation for Institutions etc.) of relevance for UniCredit Bank GmbH and its relevant subsidiaries is safeguarded by means of appropriate adjustments included in UniCredit Bank GmbH's Group Remuneration Policy. Each year, the Executive Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH approves this Group-wide remuneration strategy as a basis for remuneration within UniCredit Bank GmbH and all subsidiaries (HVB Group), followed by a respective resolution by the Supervisory Board of UCB GmbH.

### 2.1. Correlation between remuneration and success

Using as a basis its governance model, the UniCredit Group's Remuneration Policy sets the framework for a coherent and consistent design, implementation and monitoring of remuneration practices across the entire organization.

Within this common policy framework, guidelines are defined to implement remuneration programs and plans that reinforce sound risk management policies and a long-term strategy. In this way, it is possible to effectively meet the specific and constantly evolving needs of the different businesses, market conditions and employee populations. This ensures that business and human resource policies are always aligned appropriately along the remuneration approach.

Suitable remuneration structures create a working environment in which the potential of each individual employee is fostered and encouraged, while doing full justice to diversity. In this way, it is possible to recruit, retain and motivate a large number of different and highly qualified employees all around the world.

Ethical behavior and sustained performance are basic principles and main pillars of UniCredit Group's Group Remuneration Policy, serving to ensure both competitiveness and effectiveness of remuneration as well as transparency and internal fairness. Those principles contain the following aspects:

- **Clear and transparent governance** through efficient corporate and organizational governance structures, as well as clear and rigorous governance and rules;
- **Compliance with regulatory requirements and principles of good business conduct** by protecting and enhancing our company reputation, as well as avoiding or managing conflicts of interest between roles within the UniCredit Group or vis-à-vis customers;

- **Continuous monitoring of market trends and practices** and awareness of international practices, aimed at sound formulation of competitive compensation as well as at transparency and internal equity;
- **Sustainable pay for sustainable performance** by maintaining consistency between remuneration and performance, and between rewards and long-term stakeholder value creation, as well as enhancing both the actual result achieved and the means by which they are achieved;
- **Motivation and retention and fair treatment of all employees, with particular focus on talents and mission-critical resources**

## 2.2. Derivation of goals from the business strategy and the risk strategy

The remuneration systems including the parameters and remuneration strategy are geared to the achievement of the objectives enshrined in the business and risk strategies of UniCredit Bank GmbH. In this context, the remuneration parameters are geared to the strategies and support the achievement of the strategic objectives (Section 4 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions).

The strategy comprises the definition of medium- and long-term goals of the company, its business policy and guidelines as well as the means of achieving these objectives. Taking account regulatory provisions of AT 4.2. item 4 of MaRisk regulation, the management has set up a strategy process that extends above all to include the process stages of planning, implementation, assessment and adjustment of the business strategy and risk strategy.

The management has also defined a sustainable business strategy and a risk strategy that is consistent with this and the resulting risks (AT 4.2. items 1 and 2 of MaRisk). In fixing and adjusting the business strategy, both external and internal influential factors were taken into consideration (AT 4.2 item 1 of MaRisk). This business strategy is regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted.

Competitive remuneration and remuneration systems are a key element of strategic HR work for UniCredit Bank GmbH. The remuneration paid by UniCredit Bank GmbH is embedded in UniCredit Group's remuneration strategy and is also implemented within the UniCredit Bank GmbH subsidiaries. It is structured as a management instrument to support the strategic objectives and their achievement:

- The **business strategy and risk strategy of UniCredit Bank GmbH** are operationalised by the strategic KPI set (key performance indicators, KPI) as well as the "HVB Group Risk Appetite Framework" (RAF). Individual goals are defined on the basis of the parameters included in the strategic KPI set as well as other KPIs that are determined and published annually at the UniCredit Group level and included in the "KPI Bluebook". In the process, specific KPIs are defined for each business division. At least half of the goals shall be related to sustainability.

In addition, the **"Corporate Values" Integrity, Ownership and Caring** are used as a guide for defining goals and assessing performance and potential. The Corporate Values are relevant for assessing employees' strengths and fields of development within the UPM population (UniCredit Performance Management). The strengths and development fields are assigned to the Corporate Values. Accordingly, the incentive effect in the remuneration system contributes towards achieving the business strategy as well as the risk strategy goals.

- The **"HVB Group Risk Appetite Framework"** defines parameters for the following categories: "Pillar I KPIs", "Managerial KPIs", and "Specific Risk KPIs". Targets, triggers and limits are defined for these parameters in line with the business strategy. It is reviewed and approved by the Executive Board on an annual basis.
- **Multi-year planning with regard to the risk-bearing capacity of UniCredit Bank GmbH** extends across a multi-year period in line with the time horizon defined for the yearly bankwide planning and budgeting process. This also corresponds to the deferral period as part of the remuneration process for the Executive Board as well as for Risk Takers who are part of Senior Management in direct reporting line to the Executive Board.

The **business strategy and the risk strategy** are reviewed and, if necessary, revised during the annual planning process. If any changes are made to the strategies over the previous year, a check is performed to determine whether they necessitate any adjustments to the remuneration strategy.

The **extent of the total amount of variable remuneration (the "bonus pool")** is essentially determined by **"Entry Conditions"** that need to be met as a minimum requirement in terms of profitability, capital and liquidity. For 2024, these particularly include Operating EVA, Net Profit, Own Funds and Leverage Ratios, Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio of UniCredit Group and HVB Group. This ensures observance of Section 7 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (cf. *Section 4* of this report). To supplement this, further results are also taken into account from the risk dashboards in the determination of the bonus pool.

The use of the control instruments specified above (cf. strategic KPI set) safeguards the correlation between the strategy of UniCredit Bank GmbH and the goals for employees. The link between the business strategy and the risk strategy on the one hand and the remuneration strategy on the other has been implemented by People & Culture (P&C) through the close integration of the CEO, CFO and CRO units and is controlled by P&C annually.

### 2.3. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DE&I)

Within the framework provided by the Group Remuneration Policy, UniCredit is committed to an equal pay principle, ensuring fair treatment in terms of remuneration based on the role covered, the scope of responsibilities, performance outcomes and the overall quality of the contribution to business results, regardless of gender identity, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, ability, and cultural background.

The Group's undertaking for equal treatment and equal pay for all gender identities at all levels of the organisation consists of well-defined ambitions to guarantee an adequate and fair remuneration to all employees. The bank adopts gender-neutral Remuneration and Incentive policies that contribute to pursuing true equality among staff. They ensure that equal work is matched by equal pay, giving people the same access to opportunities, regardless of their diversity traits.

## 3 CONTROL BODIES FOR REMUNERATION AT UNICREDIT BANK GMBH

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### 3.1. Remuneration Officer

Pursuant to Sections 23 and 24 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions of 16 December 2013, major institutions must ensure appropriate, permanent and effective monitoring of the remuneration of their employees. To this end, a **Remuneration Officer and a qualified delegate** are to be appointed. Effective as of 1 April 2014, UniCredit Bank GmbH appointed a Remuneration Officer and, effective as of 1 June 2014, a deputy Remuneration Officer.

### 3.2. Remuneration Control Committee

UniCredit Bank GmbH has set up a Remuneration Control Committee in accordance with Section 25d (12) of the German Banking Act (KWG), read in conjunction with Section 25d (7) KWG. The Supervisory Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH has elected from its own ranks the members of the Remuneration Control Committee in accordance with Section 25d (7) Sentence 2. The Remuneration Control Committee met a total of five times in 2024 in addition to a joint meeting with the Risk Committee.

The **Remuneration Control Committee (RCC)** of UniCredit Bank GmbH:

- **monitors** the appropriate structure of the remuneration systems for the Executive Board and employees and in particular the appropriate structure of the remuneration of the head of the risk controlling function (= CRO at UniCredit Bank GmbH) and the head of the compliance function as well as employees with a material influence on the overall risk profile of the institution ("Risk Taker"). The RCC supports the Supervisory Board in monitoring the appropriate structure of the remuneration system for the Executive Board and for employees; in doing so, it must consider the effects of the remuneration systems on risk, capital and liquidity management;
- **prepares the resolutions** of the Supervisory Board on the remuneration of the Executive Board; in doing so, it particularly takes account of the impacts of the resolutions on the Bank's risks and risk management. The long-term interests of the shareholder, investors, other stakeholders and the general public must be duly taken into consideration;
- **supports** the Supervisory Board in monitoring the proper inclusion of the internal control department and all other relevant areas in the planning of the remuneration systems.

### 3.3. Remuneration Round Table (RRT)

To institutionalize the integration and coordination processes between all Control and relevant Corporate Center Units, a "Remuneration Round Table" has been initiated. It is composed of members of the People & Culture organizational units, the Remuneration Officer, the control functions as well as other relevant areas like Legal Function or Corporate Strategy.

The RRT is held at regular intervals or on an ad-hoc basis and discusses current remuneration-relevant processes, such as remuneration strategy, the Group Incentive System, Risk Taker Analysis, the KPI set as well as business strategy and risk strategy, the bonus pool process, performance management, procedures in response to breaches, etc.

## 4 BONUS PROCESS AT UNICREDIT BANK GMBH

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The total amount of variable remuneration at UniCredit Bank GmbH is based on sustainable, risk-adjusted corporate success. As a first step, assumptions for a total bonus budget on achieving the quantitative and qualitative corporate objectives are already made and adopted at the time of preparing the annual planning activities. This total bonus budget also includes the subsidiaries.

In the process, the total amount of variable remuneration is initially based on a ratio to a defined earnings dimension. At the same time, the following regulatory requirements are taken into consideration:

- The parameters according to which the total amount is determined are based on the business strategy geared to sustainable development of the institution and the risk strategies derived from this business strategy (cf. Section 4 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions);
- At the same time, the following regulatory requirements of Section 7 of Remuneration Regulation for Institutions are observed: risk-bearing capacity, multi-year capital planning and performance of the institution, the permanent maintenance of appropriate equity and liquidity resources and permanent maintenance of the capital buffer in accordance with Section 10i of the German Banking Act.

During the year, the expected size of the bonus pool is reviewed as part of the forecast process depending on trends in the relevant income, financial and risk parameters.

The basis for forming provisions is the bonus structure of the various compensation plans, taking into account deferred compensation elements and their respective maturities. Under IFRS 2, share-based payments must be included in the annual financial statements as of the date on which they were granted. In this connection, each individual bonus instalment is deferred on a pro-rated basis over the vesting period.

Accordingly, as further requirements for the extent of the bonus pool, specific criteria are defined as "Entry Conditions" and supplementary additional KPIs are included in the assessment as part of the "Performance & Risk Dashboard". This takes place both at the time of the budget fixing and when the final bonus pool is defined. The following minimum Entry Conditions must be met as of 31 December 2024 with regard to profitability, capital and liquidity:

- Operating EVA (NOP-Cost of Capital) > 0, and
- Net Profit > 0, and
- Own Funds and Leverage ratios ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" and
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (110%), and
- Net Stable Funding Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (102,0%).

The total amount of variable remuneration is determined as a next step for the main areas. For the individual sub-pools arising in the process, bonus values are proposed in accordance with the differentiated development of results of the respective segments. In this way, possible differences in the development of results of sub-segments are duly taken into account. In the process, the following sub-areas were analysed:

- Privatkundenbank (PBK), Corporates and Client Solutions (CS)
- Corporate Functions (Group Corporate Centre, CDOO and Executive Board)

A decision on the final bonus budget distribution to the areas specified above is made by the Executive Board, depending on the success achieved, and the final bonus budget distribution below the above-mentioned areas is subsequently discussed by the Committee on Economic Affairs (Wirtschaftsausschuss). The decisions on the pools of the subsidiaries are implemented via the respective regulatory bodies.

In accordance with regulatory governance parameters, final approval is ultimately obtained by other bodies on the total amount of the variable remuneration. In this connection, the RCC and also the Supervisory Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH particularly determine the appropriateness of the total amount of variable remuneration pursuant to Section 15 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions, read in conjunction with Section 25d of the German Banking Act.

Next, the individual bonus is fixed based, on the one hand, on the individual performance appraisal and, on the other, on the extent of the reference bonus defined.

## 5 ANALYSIS OF RISK TAKER (“IDENTIFIED STAFF”) 2024

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The Commission Delegated Regulation on regulatory technical standards on criteria for the identification of **Risk Taker (“Identified Staff”)** (EU) 2021/923 of 25 March 2021 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council was published on 9 June 2021.

After carrying out a risk analysis to determine the material Risk Takers (“Identified Staff”) based on the Delegated Regulation for 2024, a total of 313<sup>1</sup> material Risk Takers (2023: 334 Risk Takers) were identified at UniCredit Bank GmbH (including subsidiaries).

Due to organizational adjustments as well as changes at the employee level, the number of intra-year Risk Takers may vary. In principle, identification as a Risk Taker applies for a full year, even if the underlying criterion for identification ceases to apply in the course of the year.

## 6 REMUNERATION SYSTEMS IN 2024 AND OUTLOOK FOR 2025

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The remuneration systems at UniCredit Bank GmbH are essentially based on the system “13+1”. For by far the majority of employees, this means that 13 monthly salaries are fixed, with a variable salary component being paid depending on the corporate success and the personal level of goal achievement. The reference value for this variable salary component is one month's salary in principle. Employees in the Client Solutions (CS) area as well as Executives acc. to Section 5 of the German Works Constitution Act (“Betriebsverfassungsgesetz”) who report directly to the Senior Management as well as the Senior Management itself and the members of the Executive Board are predominantly remunerated differently from this system using a “12+x approach”. For this purpose, 12 fixed monthly salary payments are made. The variable salary component for these employees also depends on the success of UniCredit Group, UniCredit Bank GmbH, the performance of the employee and the relevant market benchmarks.

### 6.1. Executive Board (GEC & GEC-1) 2024

The remuneration system for the Executive Board members comprises a fixed salary (12 gross monthly salary payments per year) and variable remuneration.

#### Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration can amount up to a maximum of double the annual fixed compensation. For the Executive Board member responsible for CRO the annual variable remuneration cannot exceed 100% of the annual fixed compensation

In previous years, the variable compensation comprised a Short-Term Incentive (STI) and additionally a Long-Term Incentive (LTI). In 2022 those two independent plans have been combined to one plan.

#### 2024 Group Incentive System (GIS)

All Executive Board members are entitled to receive a bonus according to the 2024 Group Incentive System (GIS) for the financial year 2024 that has been approved in 2025.

The GIS bonus amount determined each year is based on the relevant market benchmarks in the respective working environment, and depends on the results of the HVB Group, the UniCredit Group, the individual reference value of the Executive Board Member and the individual performance achieved in the period under review. The variable remuneration is determined by the **Supervisory Board** of UniCredit Bank GmbH subject to prior consultation with the Remuneration Control Committee. The determination of the variable remuneration for the members of the Executive Board is predominantly based on a multi-year assessment period.

While the individual GIS is subject to individual short-term goals, based on specific goals, with a balanced mix, based on the role and seniority, of financial quantitative KPIs and qualitative goals, including both strategic and sustainability priorities, the 60% portion of the GIS award that is paid out deferred is subject to additional long-term performance conditions, which act as a “modifier” of the award defined on the basis of the short-term performance, with the effect of:

- Cancelling it, if they are below a certain threshold;
- Reducing it if they are above the threshold but below the target;
- Confirming it, if they are in line with target;
- Increasing it up to +20%, if they are above the target, allowing for overperformance up to the Bonus cap.


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<sup>1</sup> Full year perspective 2024



Individual performance is measured and assessed annually through a formal appraisal process. The individual bonus is also reassessed each year on the basis of this appraisal and may therefore vary from year to year. The achievement of goals is measured on the basis of around 6 goals (min 5 – max 8), around half of which are sustainable goals and risk adjusted and are set on a multi-year performance period.

Overview of the application of short- and long-term performance conditions:



Additional long-term performance conditions are based on specific goals covering the 3 years following the annual Short-term performance. Such goals are defined at Group level specified as "Additional long-term performance conditions".

Additional long term conditions scorecard:

Lever and KPIs	2025-27 Target	Criteria	Adj. of ST
<b>80%</b> <b>Profitability</b> <b>ROTE with CET1 @13%</b>	Avg 25-27 vs. mid term Cost of Equity (11%) <sup>B</sup>	11,5% - 13% 10% - 11,5% 5,5% - 10% < 5,5%	100%-120%* Confirmed (100%) = 0%-100%* Cancellation (0%)
<b>20%</b> <b>Sustainability</b> <b>ESG business DE&amp;I ambitions Net Zero commitments</b>	<b>Qualitative assessment</b> based on specific evidence from <b>current and future ESG and DE&amp;I strategy</b> . KPIs are subject to the evolution of ESG strategy and regulation. Current strategy foresees: • <b>ESG business penetration:</b> support our clients in their sustainability journey offering ESG related products and services to ensure a fair share of ESG business over total (lending new production, sustainable bonds, stock of AuM), starting from 2024 ESG targets <sup>C</sup> as disclosed in 4Q2023 Fixed income presentation and successive updates as per ESG strategy • <b>DE&amp;I Ambitions</b> , including reduction on Gender Pay-Gap (through 100 m Eur investment in strategic plan horizon and successive updates as per DE&I strategy) and gender parity ambition across the organizational levels • <b>"Net Zero" commitments:</b> progress vs. Net Zero 2030 target on the four most carbon intensive sectors within the portfolio, which include Oil & Gas, Power Generation, Automotive, and Steel, recently added. Targets have been set as per press release of January 31, 2023 and January 18, 2024, using the International Energy Agency (IEA) Net Zero 2050 pathway as the benchmark scenario.	GREATLY EXCEEDS EXCEEDS MEETS MOSTLY MEETS BELOW	120% 110% Confirmed (100%) = 50% Cancellation (0%)
<b>As weighted avg of Profitability and Sustainability</b>		<b>Overall adjustment<sup>A</sup> (-100% ; +20%)</b>	

\* Linear continuum

\* Linear Continuum

- BoD discretion: unlimited downward and up to +20% to evaluate broader performance and market context e.g., industry/global shocks, exceptional events, company performance notably above target in the first year of the sustainable performance plan.
- RoTE calculated as per current methodology. In case of methodological changes or material changes of the macro-economic scenario (e.g., more than 100 bps in interest rate vs. budget assumptions), the board retain the faculty to mechanically recast LT targets according to the updated scenario.
- Percentage of ESG lending new production (including Environmental, Social and Sustainability linked lending) on overall medium/long term lending new production: group 2024 target set at 15%; percentage of Sustainable bonds (for corporates and financial institutions, excluding Sovereign, Supranational and Agency Long Term Credit) on all bonds (For corporates and financial institutions, excluding Sovereign, Supranational and Agency Long Term Credit): group 2024 target set at 15%; percentage of ESG assets under management stock on Total of assets under management stock: group 2024 target set at 50%

The **Entry Conditions** apply to the grant of a bonus as well as of deferred bonus components that were approved in the past:

UniCredit Group 2024	HVB Group 2024
Operating EVA (NOP-Cost of Capital) >0, and	Operating EVA > 0, and
Net Profit > 0, and	Net Profit > 0, and
Own Funds and Leverage ratios ≥ 2024 RAF "limit", and	Own Funds and Leverage ratios ≥ 2024 RAF "limit", and
Liquidity Coverage Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (111 %), and	Liquidity Coverage Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (110 %), and
Net Stable Funding Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (102,3 %)	Net Stable Funding Ratio ≥ 2024 RAF "limit" (102,0 %)

Moreover, the total amount of the variable remuneration is determined by additional risk indicators that also relate to the capital base of the institution.

### Bonus grant

For GEC-members (HVB: CEO) the bonus is paid out 100% in shares (shares of "UniCredit S.p.A." – no stock options), for GEC-1 (HVB: MBMs and other GEC-1 members) in cash and in shares, both in four tranches distributed over six years. The shares are granted in years 2025, 2028 until 2030 for GEC members (HVB: CEO); for GEC-1 members the shares are granted in the years 2025, 2028 and 2029 they are subject in each case to a retention period of one year. The retention period corresponds to the regulatory minimum requirements in accordance with Section 20 of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions. Nevertheless, this can be taken as sufficient since Senior Managers (as well as Risk Taker in general) have only indirect influence on UniCredit S.p.A.'s share price development.

The number of shares to be allocated is defined in 2025, for both upfront and deferred equity instalments, considering the arithmetic mean of the official market price of UniCredit ordinary shares during the month preceding the Board of Directors that approves 2024 results.

Bonus payments are distributed over a five-year period, starting in 2025, as shown below:

### CEO & GEC members UC Group (HVB: CEO)

		ST perf.	LT performance						Total
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	
CEO & GEC members HVB: CEO	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash							
		Shares	40% upfront shares			20% deferred shares	20% deferred shares	20% deferred shares	100%
			1 year retention			1 year retention	1 year retention	1 year retention	

### GEC-1 members (HVB: EBM and other GEC-1 members<sup>1</sup>)

		ST perf.	LT performance						Total
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	
GEC-1 HVB: EBM & other GEC-1	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash	20% upfront cash					20% deferred cash	40%
		Shares	20% upfront shares			20% deferred shares	20% deferred shares		60%
			1 year retention			1 year retention	1 year retention		

1. Excluding control functions

In case annual variable remuneration does not exceed € 50,000 and does not represent more than one third of the staff member's total annual remuneration, the full bonus amount is entirely paid upfront and in cash.

If above mentioned Entry Conditions for the financial year 2024 are neither achieved on Group level nor on HVB Group level, the "Zero Factor" applies. Thus, a potential bonus for the financial year 2024 will forfeit completely. If Entry Conditions for the financial year 2024 are met, all tranches that may be paid out after 2025 are subject to malus conditions, providing for a potential reduction or cancellation of the originally calculated pay-out. Further information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8.

For new Management Board members where a 3-year performance period cannot be applied due to a shorter employment period in UCB GmbH, an extended deferral-scheme with 7 or 6 years (instead of 5y) is implemented in order to fulfill local regulatory requirements (IVV)

## 6.2. Top Management (Other Senior Management directly reporting to the Executive Board) 2024

The remuneration system for top management below the Executive Board consists of a fixed salary (12 gross monthly salary payments) and variable remuneration.

For all employees besides Control Functions and People & Culture, the variable remuneration can amount to a maximum of double the annual fixed compensation. Other rules apply to employees in control functions (cf. Section 6.7).

All employees are entitled to a bonus according to the 2024 Group Incentive System for the 2024 financial year that will be granted in 2025. The amount of the variable remuneration based on the GIS is determined on the basis of the criteria set out in Section 6.1 with the sole difference that the budget is approved by the Executive Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH.

### Bonus grant

- For top executives (GEC-1) reporting directly to a GEC member, the Deferral Scheme applies as set out in Section 6.1 applies.
- For Other Senior Management directly reporting to the Management Board, the following Deferral Scheme applies:

		ST perf.							Total	
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030		
Other Senior Mgmt. directly reporting to the Executive Board	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash	20% upfront cash						20% deferred cash	40%
		Shares	20% upfront shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares		60%	
		<div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div></div>								

The bonus is payable in cash and in shares (shares of UniCredit S.p.A. - no stock options) in six tranches over six years. The shares are granted in 2025 until 2029 and are each subject to a one-year retention period.

The Entry Conditions apply to the grant of a bonus as well as deferred bonus components that were approved in the past in accordance with Section 6.1 Variable Remuneration.

In case annual variable remuneration does **not exceed € 50,000** and does **not represent more than one third of the staff member's total annual remuneration**, the full bonus amount is entirely paid upfront and in cash.


Further information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8. Following legal or regulatory provisions, the payout of variable compensation elements can be limited or even prohibited by responsible authorities.

## 6.3. Executives acc. to §5 BetrVG below Senior Management 2024

The remuneration system for Executives acc. to §5 BetrVG below Senior Management, who are generally on the hierarchy level below the Top Management, consists of a fixed salary (12 gross monthly salary payments per year) and a variable remuneration, regardless of whether they work in a sales or non-sales segment. Exceptions apply only to employees whose contract does not include any incentive opportunity clause, particularly in the Client Solutions (CS)-area. The remuneration system applicable to these employees is described in Section 6.4 of this report.

They are entitled to a bonus for the 2024 financial year that has been granted in 2025. The bonus assessment is based on an individual "incentive opportunity". In combination with the rules for granting bonuses, its value is set so that the bonus payment cannot exceed double the annual fixed compensation. Other rules apply to employees in control functions (cf. Section 6.7). The calculation of variable remuneration rests on four main pillars (see chart below). This applies to all with exceptions applying only to Client Solutions employees with no incentive opportunity clause in their contracts.

Four pillars for determining the variable remuneration of Executives acc. to §5 BetrVG below Senior Management



Variable remuneration

The basis for variable remuneration is the individually defined **incentive opportunity**.

The bonus is recalculated each year. The **amount** is determined by the **bonus basis value** and the individual goal achievement of these executives and on the basis of the available bonus pool defined by the Executive Board depending on the success of UniCredit Bank GmbH and the UniCredit Group.

For all employees the bonus payment can amount to a maximum of double the annual fixed compensation. Other rules apply to employees in control functions as well as for People & Culture (cf. Section 6.7).

For the bonus, budgets are set aside annually for the individual divisions. The bonus budgets of the sales divisions are determined on the basis of the performance of the divisions over the last financial year. The bonus budgets for the Chief Digital & Operating Officer (CDOO) and Group Corporate Centre (GCC) areas are based on the average of the sales divisions (without taking into account positive and negative non-recurring effects), and therefore are based on the success of HVB Group.

To calculate the annual budget, the Executive Board determines a success factor for each segment on the basis of the business success of the HVB Group in the year in question, taking sustainability factors into account (risks incurred, capital and liquidity costs). The **success factor** amounts to at least 0.5 unless the HVB Group shows a loss in its financial statements. The maximum success factor is 1.5. The Executive Board thus decides, based on how well the various segments have achieved their goals, on how the overall bonus budget will be allocated to them.

Within each division, the responsible Executive Board member allocates the budget following a cascading process, taking into account respective business performance and value contribution, to the next reporting line. The budget allocation to Executives acc to §5 BetrVG is oriented on the respective budget unit in line with the guidelines for payscale and non-payscale employees.

At the beginning of each year Executives and their managers define a set of goals, from five to eight. These must also include targets to reflect sustainable business success (e.g., customer satisfaction). The goals take into account the individual requirements of the segment in question as well as the segment-specific strategies and objectives. With reference to economic and non-economic goal setting, statutory and regulatory requirements need to be taken into account; this also applies to control functions of UniCredit Bank GmbH, in which the primary focus must be on qualitative goals.

Individual performance and success are measured in the annual goal achievement review on a five-point scale. The **manager** determines the **individual bonus level** within the applicable bonus range, taking into account the available budget. To summarize, the amount to be paid is calculated in a preliminary step by multiplying the bonus base value by the applicable success factor. This value is now multiplied by the percentage set by the manager – on the basis of the assessment in the performance review – within the bonus ranges, depending on the employee's level of goal achievement.

In case of negative deviation of the performance from set goals (inadequate performance, inconsistent performance) the personal factor for bonus determination must be lower than 100%. Immoral behavior or behavior, which means a breach of the employee's contractual duties, shall also be deemed as negative deviation of the performance from set goals. Additional rules set out in Section 6.6 apply to employees who have been identified as Risk Taker (Identified Staff). Further information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8.

Following legal or regulatory provisions, the payout of variable compensation elements can be limited or even prohibited by responsible authorities.

#### **6.4. Client Solutions 2024**

The classic remuneration system for Client Solutions (Advisory & Capital Markets, Specialized Lending, Client Risk Management, Financial Institutions Group (FIG), Key Client Solutions and International Network) comprises a fixed salary and variable remuneration. In this case, the employment contract does not include any incentive opportunity clause. The fixed salary comprises 12 gross monthly salary payments. The Total Compensation approach applies, i.e., the value of the additional company benefits is included in the fixed salary.

##### **Variable remuneration**

All employees are entitled to receive a bonus for the financial year 2024, which has been granted in 2025. For the personnel belonging to the business functions the variable remuneration can amount to a maximum of double the annual fixed compensation.

The bonus fixed on an annual basis depends on the relevant comparative benchmarks of the market in the respective working environment and depends on the results of the Group, of Client Solutions, of HVB Group and the performance of the unit in which the employee is engaged as well as on the individually achieved performance in the period under review. Special contributions to profit or loss or the risk behavior of employees are also considered in the process.

The bonus budget of the CS area is determined by qualitative and quantitative risk-adjusted performance parameters. In addition to the performance of the CS division in Germany, factors such as market trends and changes in competition as well as key sustainability parameters (such as the relation of risk to gross contribution) also determine the bonus budget. The budget is approved by the Executive Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH. The Executive Board member of UniCredit Bank GmbH responsible for CS jointly decides on the distribution of the overall budget together with the responsible personnel of the Global Product Lines, taking account of the performance of CS subsegments.

Individual performance is measured and assessed annually through a formal appraisal process. The individual bonus is also reassessed each year on the basis of this appraisal and may therefore vary from year to year. In case of negative deviation of the performance from set goals (inadequate performance, inconsistent performance,) the personal factor for bonus determination must be lower than 100%. Immoral behavior or behavior, which means a breach of the employee's contractual duties, shall also be deemed as negative deviation of the performance from set goals.

The Entry Conditions apply to the grant of a bonus as well as deferred bonus components that were approved in the past in accordance with Section 6.1 Variable Remuneration.

Additional rules set out in Section 6.6 apply to employees who have been identified as Risk Taker (Identified Staff). Further information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8 of this report.

Following legal or regulatory provisions, the payout of variable compensation elements can be limited or even prohibited by responsible authorities.

#### **6.5. Pay-scale and non-pay-scale employees 2024**

The remuneration system for pay-scale and non-pay-scale employees is based on "13+1" and, for the purposes of variable remuneration, rests on four main pillars (target bonus, success factor, individual assessment, amount paid) that are equally applicable to all pay-scale and non-pay-scale employees of UniCredit Bank GmbH, regardless of the segment in which they work, in accordance with Section 6.3 of this report (chart). Remuneration for vocational training is governed in a comparable manner.

The purpose is to reward the employees' performance and contribution to the Bank's success with an attractive bonus. This applies both to pay-scale and non-pay-scale employees.

Exceptions apply to employees with Total Compensation contracts and those who fall under a separate works agreement for remuneration in the Client Solutions area (cf. Section 6.4). As part of a Total Compensation concept, these employees receive a total annual salary comprising a fixed salary and a bonus. The extent of the variable remuneration is determined annually by UniCredit Bank GmbH, taking account of the performance of the employee in the financial year ended, team behaviour, the assessed contribution to the division, the HVB Group and the UniCredit Group within the provided bonus budget and following legal and regulatory provisions.

## „13+1“ as a basis

All pay-scale and non-pay-scale employees of UniCredit Bank GmbH – regardless of whether they work for sales or non-sales segments – receive an annual salary consisting of 12 monthly gross salary payments per year, a special payment (one gross monthly salary payment) and a bonus which is also based as a rule on one gross monthly salary ("**target bonus**"). The bonus is determined annually for the previous year and the extent of the bonus depends on the base value and the employee's individual goal achievement as well as on the bonus budget available owing to the success of the HVB Group. Budgets for the bonus are set aside annually for the individual divisions (cf. Section 6.3 Variable Remuneration).

The employees and their managers define goals at the beginning of each financial year within the scope of a performance review session. During the annual performance management session, individual performance and success are evaluated in accordance with the five-point scale described in Section 6.3. (inadequate performance, inconsistent performance, solid performance, strong performance, outstanding performance) by means of which the bonus is determined within the bonus measurement ranges.

Additional rules set out in Section 6.6 of this report apply to employees who have been identified as Risk Taker (Identified Staff). Further information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8 of this report.

Following legal or regulatory provisions, the payout of variable compensation elements can be limited or even prohibited by responsible authorities.

### 6.6. Identified Staff 2024 (Risk Taker)

For employees with a material impact on the overall risk profile of UniCredit Bank GmbH/HVB Group ("Risk Takers" or "Identified Staff"), special conditions apply to variable remuneration with regard to claims, deferral and disbursement. For instance, bonus amounts may be deferred for a number of years in certain circumstances and also be payable in some other form, e.g., in equities. The bonus for 2024 has been determined in 2025. Moreover, the entitlement to variable remuneration is subject to additional conditions. The employees affected by these special regulations are informed accordingly by UniCredit Bank GmbH.

For Executive Board members and other GEC-1 the deferral schemes described in Section 6.1 applies.

#### Bonus grant for "Other Identified Staff":

- In case annual variable remuneration set for 2024 does not exceed € 50,000 or does not represent more than one third of the staff member's total annual remuneration, the full bonus amount is entirely paid upfront and in cash;
- In case the sum of bonus and other variable remuneration elements is higher than € 50,000 or one third of the total annual remuneration, the full bonus amount is subject to the following schemes:
  - The following five-year deferral scheme applies to Risk Takers with management responsibility **reporting directly to the Executive Board**:

		ST perf.						Total		
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029		2030	
Other Senior Mgmt. directly reporting to the Executive Board	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash	20% upfront cash						20% deferred cash	40%
		Shares	20% upfront shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares			60%
		<div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div><div>1 year retention</div></div>								

The bonus is payable in cash and in shares (shares of UniCredit S.p.A. - no stock options) in six tranches over five years. The shares are granted in 2025 until 2029 and are each subject to a one-year retention period.

- For Risk Takers **without a direct reporting line to the Executive Board**, the following four-year deferral schemes are applied depending on the amount of the variable remuneration determined for FY 2024:

- Variable remuneration greater than € 50,000 or one third of the total annual remuneration but equal to or below € 430,000:

		ST perf.						
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total
Other MRT not directly reporting to the Executive Board with variable remuneration ≤ 430K€	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash	30% upfront cash			10% deferred cash	10% deferred cash	50%
		Shares	30% upfront shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares			50%
			1 year retention	1 year retention	1 year retention			

- Variable remuneration greater than € 430,000 the following deferral scheme is applied:

		ST perf.						
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total
Other MRT not directly reporting to the Executive Board with variable remuneration > 430K€	ALLOCATION VIEW	Cash	20% upfront cash			15% deferred cash	15% deferred cash	50%
		Shares	20% upfront shares	15% deferred shares	15% deferred shares			50%
			1 year retention	1 year retention	1 year retention			

Bonus grants are made in five tranches in cash and UniCredit S.p.A shares (no stock options). The shares granted in 2025 until 2027 are each subject to a one-year retention period.

The number of shares to be allocated is defined in 2025, for both upfront and deferred equity instalments, considering the arithmetic mean of the official market price of UniCredit ordinary shares during the month preceding the Board of Directors that approves 2024 results.

The Entry Conditions in accordance with Section 6.1 Variable Remuneration (Operating EVA, Net Profit Own Funds and Leverage ratios, Liquidity Coverage Ratio, Net Stable Funding Ratio) apply to the grant of deferred bonus components.

In case Capital or Liquidity “entry conditions” for the business year 2024 are not met on Group level or HVB Group level, the malus condition is activated, triggering the application of Zero Factor on current year bonus. Thus, a potential bonus for the business year 2024 for Risk Taker will forfeit completely. For the other employees, a significant reduction will be applied. If Entry Conditions for the business year 2024 are met, all tranches that may be paid out after 2024 are subject to malus conditions, providing for a potential reduction or cancellation of pay-out. Additional information on the rules on negative performance contributions and "clawback" arrangements can be found in Section 6.8 of this report.

### 6.7. Special regulations for Control Functions

For employees in control functions, the fixed remuneration is a predominant component of total remuneration. For the variable remuneration for employees in control functions – Compliance, Audit Management and Risk Management – the following difference applies as an exception to the regulations described above in order to avoid any conflict of interests between the control units and the central units: **No remuneration parameters parallel** to those applied to the monitored units are defined for determining the amount of the variable remuneration.

Moreover, the focus is on qualitative goals in the control and central units. For control units targets linked to economic results have to be avoided. The amount of the variable remuneration in control functions may not exceed one-third of the total remuneration. For employees under People & Culture the fixed remuneration is the predominant component of the total remuneration and the variable remuneration is  $\leq 80\%$  of the fixed one.

In addition, with regard to UniCredit Bank GmbH Executive Board decisions, the bonus pool for this group of employees is not determined by the results of a single division, but rather by the average of all sales divisions. As a result, there is no danger of a potential conflict of interest.

## 6.8. Negative performance contributions and clawback rules

Any disbursement within the scope of the remuneration systems described above presupposes a review of compliance-conformant and proper behavior as contemplated by the organization directives of UniCredit Bank GmbH.

If, for regulatory reasons, the entitlement of a Risk Taker to variable remuneration only arises pro rata temporis (several annual partial entitlements), the variable remuneration is subject, to the extent legally permissible to a clawback. The clawback mechanisms can be activated also after notice and/or termination of employment in accordance with local legal requirements, to the extent permitted by law. The right to such clawback generally expires five years after each instalment; in cases where a longer deferral period is necessary due to regulatory requirements an extended clawback period is applicable.

A negative deviation of (i) the employee's performance or (ii) the performance of the employee's organizational unit from the set goals and (iii) a negative deviation of the Bank's respectively HVB Subgroup's overall performance from the set goals lead to a reduction of the variable remuneration or may even lead to a complete forfeiture. This applies especially in the following cases:

- in cases of non-achievement of goal settings (quantitative and qualitative goals), especially when KPIs related to remuneration components have not been reached or
- in cases of employee behavior which is contrary to duty and/or immoral, especially compliance breaches and other breaches against contractual obligations.

This applies both to the respective determination of the variable remuneration and - in the case of Risk Takers - to the subsequent performance evaluation, which may lead to a reduction or to a complete forfeiture of the variable remuneration retained from preceding evaluated assessment periods. If an initially positive performance contribution was taken into account during the determination of the bonus, but with course of time becomes significantly negative, the respective retained remuneration for Risk Takers has to be reduced or may forfeit completely. In particular, in cases where a breach of obligation resulted to be very serious and led to the termination of the employment relationship, a complete forfeiture of the variable remuneration/deferral may occur. Moreover, in case negative performance contributions are at hand, variable remuneration components for Risk Takers referring to the year, in which the relevant behavior occurred, have to forfeit completely. Negative performance contributions are at hand in the following cases:

- The employee is involved in or responsible to a decisive degree for any behavior that leads to a substantial loss being sustained by the Bank or a significant regulatory sanction being imposed on UniCredit Bank GmbH or the Employee.
- The Employee violates any external or internal regulations regarding suitability and behavior to a serious degree.

## 6.9. Non-cash benefits in kind/non-financial benefits

Employees of UniCredit Bank GmbH receive additional financial and non-financial benefits, depending on the remuneration system. These comprise e.g., company retirement benefits, asset formation benefits, reduced prices of Bank products, family service, social counselling service, sport and leisure offerings.

## 6.10. Changes to the remuneration system of UniCredit Bank GmbH starting in financial year 2025

The Executive Board of UniCredit Bank GmbH has decided to generally retain the remuneration systems at UniCredit Bank GmbH for financial year 2025. Smaller changes primarily concern the Entry Conditions for the assessment of the variable compensation's total amount.

## 6.11. One-off share-award for Group Material Risk Takers

In line with the Remuneration Policy presented to the UniCredit Annual General Meeting (AGM) in April 2024, a one-off share award for all Group Material Risk Taker (GMRTs) was implemented to manage the transition following the EBA clarifications on share pricing. UniCredit immediately implemented these provisions, moving to an ex-post-performance pricing mechanism and without any adjustment for missed dividends prior to vesting due to regulatory requirements.

Indeed, this change in the share pricing methodology, had two short term relevant implications:

- the shares awarded and deferred as long-term variable compensation are not "ordinary shares", are worth less than market shares, as they don't have dividend rights till vesting and are restricted
- the share conversion price – to determine the actual number of shares from the "nominal amount" of the award - is set at the end of the performance period and not, as until 2023, at the beginning. For the transition year, given the confirmed positive share price trend of UniCredit in 2024, the number of shares awarded for the same nominal amount would diminish proportionally to the share price increase in the market, misaligning the management team with shareholders' interests.

The shift of the ex-post share pricing model without dividend adjustments has resulted in a reduction in the economic value of variable remuneration subject to deferrals. To manage these unintended consequences, it was granted a one-time variable award in shares to all GMRTs (receiving variable remuneration in shares) limited to the 2024 transition year.



The one-off award is fully paid in shares as variable remuneration funded within 2024 bonus pool, complying with the limits of the regulatory variable-to-fixed cap, with deferrals subject to the ordinary malus and claw-back provisions foreseen by regulatory requirements.

This measure is crucial to ensure the team is fairly compensated for their outstanding performance in the market and aims at maintaining the effectiveness of the bank's variable remuneration framework, in full alignment with our shareholders' interests.

#### **6.12. Overview of all remuneration systems of the financial year 2025**

For all remuneration systems of UniCredit Bank GmbH mentioned above for financial year 2025, a further, more detailed description is available on the homepage of UniCredit Bank GmbH.

The need for more specific information in this report has been dispensed with, and explanatory notes on the individual systems are available at any time from the following website:

<https://www.hypovereinsbank.de/hvb/ueber-uns/investor-relations-en/corporate-governance-en>

## **7 MAXIMUM LIMIT OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION**

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In accordance with Section 25a (5) of the German Banking Act (KWG), banks must lay down an appropriate ratio of variable to fixed annual remuneration. In principle, the maximum amount of variable remuneration has been set at 100% of the fixed remuneration since 1 January 2014. With the approval of the shareholders, this upper limit may be increased to a maximum of 200%.

At the Shareholders Meeting in June 2014, UniCredit Bank GmbH adopted a resolution to raise the upper limit for variable compensation in relation to fixed remuneration to 2:1 for all employees of UniCredit Bank GmbH apart from employees in control functions in accordance with Section 2 (11) of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (IVV). For employees in the control functions as contemplated by Section 9 (2) IVV, the Bank is still required to ensure that fixed remuneration is the main component. The amount of the variable remuneration in the control functions is limited to one-third of the total remuneration. For employees under People & Culture the fixed remuneration is the predominant component of the total remuneration and the variable remuneration is ≤ 80% of the fixed one.

For the Executive Board, the bonus payment can likewise amount to a maximum of double the annual fixed compensation with the exception of the Executive Board Members with CRO responsibility, for whom the annual variable component may not exceed 100% of the annual fixed remuneration.

The main reason for the adjustment to the upper limit is to retain the existing flexibility regarding the institution's overall costs and, in particular, to have the option of adjusting the variable remuneration or dispensing with it altogether when results turn out poorer.

Based on the model used at UniCredit Bank GmbH to calculate total variable remuneration on a risk-adjusted basis (bonus pool model) and the fact that the overall bonus pool is relatively small compared to profit, a possible increase in the variable remuneration ratio would not be expected to pose any potential risk to the Bank's capital or liquidity position.

## 8 REMUNERATION INFORMATION 2024

The following table shows the amount and structure of the remuneration of HVB Group according to Article 450 CRR in connection with Section 16 (1) of the Remuneration Regulation for Institutions.

The following applies to all remuneration information below:

- Number of staff reported in the tables refers to the full-time and year equivalent for 2024, unless otherwise required by CRR/CRD. Considering all leavers in 2024.
- Consistently related to HVB Group that also contains the international network and consolidated subsidiaries.
- For reasons of group-wide consolidation, secondments within the UniCredit Group are fully accounted at the legal entity at which they were predominantly active in the reporting period.
- Fixed remuneration according to §2 IVV. Including additional fixed benefits (e.g., pension and regular benefits granted uniformly due to internal policies).
- Variable remuneration according to §2 IVV and CRD art. 94. Including additional variable benefits (e.g. severance payments granted this year and guaranteed variable payments, One-off Share-Award).
- The final entire grant of the LTIP 2020-23 is considered and will be paid out exclusively in shares over several years.
- Number of Risk Takers / Identified Staff may differ due to different calculation requirements and for reasons of consolidation.
- Tables may contain rounding differences.

**Remuneration information 2024 pursuant to Section 16 (1) of Remuneration Regulation for Institutions (IVV) and Art. 450 CRR: all employees**

	SUPERVISORY FUNCTION	MANAGEMENT BODY <sup>1</sup>	INVESTMENT BANKING	COMMERCIAL BANKING	ASSET MANAGEMENT	CENTRAL FUNCTIONS <sup>2</sup>	CONTROL FUNCTIONS <sup>3</sup>	TOTAL
Number of staff members (Headcount)	14	12	1.406	5.807	-	3.112	1.003	11.354
Total number of staff in FTE <sup>4</sup>	-	10	1.244	4.975	-	2.636	880	9.746
<b>Remuneration (€ millions)</b>								
Total amount	1	16	298	653	-	298	127	1.394
of which:								
Fixed remuneration	1	8	196	550	-	255	112	1.122
Variable remuneration	-	8	102	103	-	44	15	272
of which:								
performance related	-	5	75	51	-	25	10	167
other variable remuneration <sup>5,6</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
severance payments <sup>5,7</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88

**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> Executive Management Board of the UniCredit Bank GmbH.

<sup>2</sup> Central functions and settlement units without control functions.

<sup>3</sup> Independent control functions: Compliance, Internal Audit and Risk Management.

<sup>4</sup> Employees shown as full-time equivalents; supervisory board members not included in overall FTE-Total.

<sup>5</sup> Includes also non standard compensation e.g. sign-on bonuses, bonus buy-outs and One-off Share-Award.

<sup>6</sup> For reasons of confidentiality and against the background of the partially small number of beneficiaries, the values are only shown in total.

<sup>7</sup> Entitlement in 2024 - Payout might be deferred.

Proportion of variable remuneration in total remuneration:

- Variable remuneration accounts for a total of 19.5% of total remuneration.
- For the members of the management body, the share of variable compensation amounts to 48.7% of total remuneration.
- In Corporate & Investment Banking, the share of variable remuneration payments amounts to 34.3%.
- In Commercial Banking, variable remuneration amounts accounts for 15.8%.
- Within the central segments and control functions, the share of variable remuneration stands at 13.7%.

Generally speaking, the ratio of variable remuneration to total remuneration is appropriate.

## EU REM 1 – Remuneration of identified staff awarded for the financial year 2024

in € million unless otherwise stated		MB Supervisory function	MB Management function	Other senior management <sup>1</sup>	Other identified staff	Total
Fixed remuneration	Number of identified staff	12	11	54	179	257
	Total fixed remuneration	1	8	17	49	75
	Of which: cash-based	1	6	14	39	60
	Of which: shares or equivalent ownership interests	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: other instruments	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: other forms <sup>2</sup>	-	2	3	10	16
Variable remuneration	Number of identified staff	-	11	54	175	240
	Total variable remuneration <sup>3</sup>	-	8	19	35	62
	Of which: cash-based	-	2	12	19	33
	Of which: deferred	-	1	1	5	7
	Of which: shares or equivalent ownership interests	-	6	7	16	29
	Of which: deferred	-	6	7	16	29
	Of which: share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: deferred	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: other instruments	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: deferred	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: other forms	-	-	-	-	-
	Of which: deferred	-	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration (2 + 10)		1	16	36	84	137

### Notes EU REM1:

<sup>1</sup> Other senior management comprises the Group Material Risk Takers 2024 identified as per art 92.3a CRD V.

<sup>2</sup> Value related to a sub-set of benefits - e.g. accommodation, company car, health insurance, pension and schooling - assigned according to Group/Local Policies.

<sup>3</sup> Includes also non standard compensation e.g. sign-on bonuses, bonus buy-outs etc. and One-off Share-Award.

## EU REM 2 – Special payments of identified staff for the financial year 2024

in € million unless otherwise stated	MB Supervisory function	MB Management function	Other senior management <sup>1</sup>	Other identified staff	Total
<b>Guaranteed variable remuneration awards<sup>2</sup></b>					
Guaranteed variable remuneration awards - Number of identified staff	-	-	-	-	3
Guaranteed variable remuneration awards - Total amount	-	-	-	-	0,6
Of which guaranteed variable remuneration awards paid during the financial year, that are not taken into account in the bonus cap	-	-	-	-	0,4
<b>Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year</b>					
Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year - Number of identified staff	-	-	-	-	0,3
Severance payments awarded in previous periods, that have been paid out during the financial year - Total amount	-	-	-	-	1
<b>Severance payments awarded during the financial year</b>					
Severance payments awarded during the financial year - Number of identified staff	-	-	-	-	17
Severance payments awarded during the financial year - Total amount	-	-	-	-	14
Of which paid during the financial year	-	-	-	-	2
Of which deferred	-	-	-	-	11
Of which severance payments paid during the financial year, that are not taken into account in the bonus cap	-	-	-	-	2
Of which highest payment that has been awarded to a single person	-	-	-	-	1

### Notes EU REM 2:

• For reasons of confidentiality and against the background of the small number of beneficiaries, the values are only shown in total.

• Population in scope refers to 2024 Group Material Risk Takers.

• The severance amounts include all elements of the exit package (e.g. Indemnity in Lieu of Notice)

<sup>1</sup> Other senior management comprises the Group Material Risk Takers 2024 identified as per art 92.3a CRD V.

<sup>2</sup> Guaranteed bonus, sign-ons und bonus buy outs considered as guaranteed variable remuneration.

## EU REM 3 – Deferred remuneration of identified staff

Deferred and retained remuneration in € million unless otherwise stated	Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded for previous performance periods <sup>1</sup>	Of which due to vest in the financial year	Of which vesting in subsequent financial years	Amount of performance adjustment made in the financial year to deferred remuneration that was due to vest in the financial year	Amount of performance adjustment made in the financial year to deferred remuneration that was due to vest in future performance years	Total amount of adjustment during the financial year due to ex post implicit adjustments (i.e. changes of value of deferred remuneration due to the changes of prices of instruments) <sup>2</sup>	Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded before the financial year actually paid out in the financial year <sup>3</sup>	Total amount of deferred remuneration awarded for previous performance period that has vested but is subject to retention periods <sup>1</sup>
<b>MB Supervisory function</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cash-based	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shares or equivalent ownership interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other forms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>MB Management function</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	-	-	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>
Cash-based	2	0	2	-	-	-	1	-
Shares or equivalent ownership interests	16	2	14	-	-	11	3	7
Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other instruments	0	0	0	-	-	-	0	0
Other forms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Other senior management</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	-	-	<b>17</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>
Cash-based	4	0	4	-	-	-	3	-
Shares or equivalent ownership interests	24	8	16	-	-	17	7	13
Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other forms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Other identified staff</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	-	-	<b>20</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>
Cash-based	10	1	8	-	-	-	10	-
Shares or equivalent ownership interests	29	14	15	-	-	20	18	27
Share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other forms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total amount</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>58</b>	-	-	<b>48</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>48</b>

### Notes EU REM3:

Population in scope refers to 2024 Group Material Risk Takers.

<sup>1</sup> Equity-based deferral based on the average share price of the month preceding the BoD (Board of Directors) approving FY financial results - from 09.01.2025 to 09.02.2025 (43,291 EUR)

<sup>2</sup> Delta between share price at grant and share price as reported in note 1

<sup>3</sup> Italian fiscal value (average of the month preceding the share allocation 2024, Jan 24th - Feb 24th 2024); 28,343 EUR

## EU REM 4 – Remuneration of identified staff of 1 million EUR or more for 2024

Total Remuneration in EUR	Identified staff that are high earners as set out in Article 450(i) CRR
1 000 000 to below 1 500 000	21
1 500 000 to below 2 000 000	9
2 000 000 to below 2 500 000	0
2 500 000 to below 3 000 000	1
3 000 000 to below 3 500 000	1
3 500 000 to below 4 000 000	1
4 000 000 to below 4 500 000	0

### Notes EU REM4:

- Effective and pro rata remuneration for 2024 as per EU REM1 table.
- All components of remuneration are taken into account, including severance payments and early retirement agreements.

## EU REM 5 – Information on remuneration of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on institutions' risk profile (identified staff)

in € million unless otherwise stated	Management body remuneration			Business areas						Total
	MB Supervisory function	MB Management function	Total MB	Investment banking	Commercial Banking <sup>1</sup>	Asset management	Corporate functions	Independent internal control functions	All other	
<b>Total number of identified staff</b>										<b>257</b>
Of which: members of the MB	12	11	25							
Of which: other senior management				2	25	-	19	8	-	
Of which: other identified staff				57	44	-	17	61	-	
<b>Total remuneration of identified staff</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>37</b>	-	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	-	
Of which: variable remuneration	-	8	8	27	18	-	5	4	-	
Of which: fixed remuneration	1	8	9	23	19	-	9	15	-	

### Notes EU REM5:

Effective remuneration data as per EU REM1 table.

<sup>1</sup> Contains Retail and Corporate Banking

**Disclaimer**

The purpose of this disclosure report is solely to meet the applicable disclosure requirements. The contents of this disclosure report relate to 31 December 2024 as the reporting date.

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